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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
holds out another, or allows him to appear, as the owner of, or as
having full power of disposition over the property, and innocent
third parties are thus led into dealing with such apparent owner,
they will be protected.'' 35 For more than a month defendant
acquiesced in the public display of the ring. Defendant's officer
also made no effort to inform possible purchasers of the nature
of the agreement. And although such regular dealings were "on
memorandum," the owner did not insist on compliance with the
provisions he himself laid down. The owner was therefore re-
sponsible for the appearance of a general, unrestricted authority
in the dealer to sell such items received on such memorandum and
cannot be heard later to assert his title against the innocent pur-
chaser.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey in the recent case of Nel-
son v. Wolf,36 considered the statute for the first time. There too
the defendant had consigned a diamond ring to the dealer under
a memorandum similar to the one employed in this case. The
dealer had used the ring as collateral for a $4,000 loan from the
plaintiff and later the debt was canceled as consideration for the
plaintiff's purchase of the ring, although no bill of sale was ever
given. Subsequently, the plaintiff redelivered the ring to the
dealer upon another memorandum and the dealer returned the
ring to the defendant upon his demand. Observing that the plain-
tiff was not a bona fide purchaser in the ordinary and regular
course of business, because he never received a bill of sale or other
written evidence of the purchase, and previous unsatisfactory
dealings with the dealer put him on notice that the title might be
questionable, the New Jersey court held that the defendant was
not precluded from denying the dealer's authority to sell. The
Court of Appeals in the instant case easily distinguished the New
Jersey decision on the facts in reversing the Appellate Division 7
and holding for the plaintiff.
XII. ToRTs
Last Clear Chance
While the doctrine of last clear chance has been severely crit-
icized, it is generally justified as a modification of the strict rule
of contributory negligence.' Defendant's negligence is said to be
35. McNeil v. Tenth Nat. Bank, suPra at 329.
36. 4 N. J. 76, 71 A. 2d 630 (1950).
37. 279 App. Div. 28, 107 N. Y. S. 2d 618 (1st Dep't 1951).
1. See PRossEP, TORTS 416 (1941); Lee v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 269 N. Y. 53,
55, 198 N. E. 629, 630 (1935), requiring that an issue of contributory negligence be
present before last clear chance can be invoked. For a complete survey of the last clear
chance doctrine, see 92 A. L R. 48, supplemented by 119 A. L R. 1041.
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the sole cause of the injury and the doctrine is applied when plain-
tiff's situation is known to defendant in time to avert the conse-
quences of plaintiff's negligence. 2  Under this reasoning, plain-
tiff's negligence is not the proximate cause of his injury where
defendant had a last clear chance to avoid the accident.' To apply
the doctrine, plaintiff's negligence must be prior to, not contem-
poraneous with the defendant's negligence4
In New York, it was early established that the defendant must
have actual knowledge that another is in a state of present peril
although such knowledge may be established by circumstantial
evidence.5 However, in a recent case,6 the court applied the doc-
trine where a truck driver was attracted by a hand rapping at his
window, an attempt, by one of two boys who had hitched a ride, to
stop the truck because the other was falling off. The court in the
Chadwick case reasoned that the doctrine can be invoked as long
as there is knowledge that someone is in peril; even though the
exact nature of the danger or the identity of the particular person
threatened is unknown to the defendant.
In Kumkumian v. City of New York,' plaintiff was struck in a
subway tunnel midway between stations by defendant's train.
The train was coasting between stations when it came to an emer-
gency stop caused by the automatic braking equipment. This de-
vice can be actuated in any of three ways: 1) by the blowing of an
electric pneumatic valve; 2) by a passenger pulling the emergency
strap; 3) by the operation of a tripping device under each car
indicating that some object had come in contact therewith.
After the train stopped, the motorman immediately reset the
brakes and proceeded. This tended to show that the valves were
in order. However, after traveling about a car's length the train
again went into "emergency." Once more the brakes were reset
2. Storr v. New York Central R. R., 261 N. Y. 348, 185 N. E. 407 (1933).
3. Bragg v. Central New England Ry. Co., 228 N. Y. 54, 126 N. E. 253 (1920).
4. Hernandez v. Brooklyn and Queen's Transit Co., 284 N. Y. 535, 32 N. E. 2d
542 (1940) ; Panarese v. Union Ry., 261 N. Y. 233, 185 N. E. 84 (1933).
5. Wolossynowski v. New York Central R. R., 254 N Y. 206, 208, 172 N. E. 471,
472 (1930), "knowledge may be established by circumstantial evidence, even in the face
of professions of ignorance . . . but knowledge there must be, or negligence so reckless
as to betoken indifference to knowledge."
6. Chadick v. City of New York, 301 N. Y. 176, 93 N. E. 2d 625 (1950) ; see
1 Bn.o. L. REv. 56 (1950).
7. The doctrine is not limited to "situations where the defendant has precise
knowledge of both the exact nature of the danger and of the particular individual
threatened so long as there is proof to support an inference that someone is in peril
that when defendant first became conscious of the impending danger and whether he
then did all a reasonable man would under the circumstances to prevent disaster were
questions of fact for the jury." Chadwick v.- City of New York, supra at 181, 93 N. E.
2d at 628.
8.305 N. Y. 167, 111 N. E. 2d 865 (1953).
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and the train started. After a third emergency halt, the motor-
man and conductor finally investigated and thereupon found de-
cedent's body wedged under the train. Until this time, no steps
had been taken to ascertain what was causing the emergency stops.
The court, after holding that a jury could reasonably infer
that the fatal injuries did not occur until after the second stop,
found that the invocation of the last clear chance doctrine was not
forbidden as a matter of law. While the court fails to enunciate
clearly the exact basis for its application, it indicates that the
result is probably based on either of two grounds. First, Judge
Froessel states that it is a question of fact whether defendant's
conduct was "negligence so reckless as to betoken indifference to
knowledge." 9  However, when the court in the Woloszynowski
case indicated that last clear chance can be employed where de-
fendant's negligence is merely "reckless" it was only stating
dictim.10 Furthermore, the presence of an element of wantonness
obviates the necessity of invoking last clear chance since contribu-
tory negligence is not a bar to recovery when this element is pres-
ent." Secondly, it is pointed out that the defendant may have re-
ceived "the requisite knowledge upon which a reasonably prudent
man would act ' 12 through the operation of the automatic braking
equipment. The court indicates that the doctrine could be ap-
plied if defendant's lack of knowledge as to decedent's position
came about through its own "wilful indifference to the emer-
gency" or because of its "belatedly carrying out of its plain duty
to investigate."
The court may be reasoning that the defendant had actual
knowledge of the peril. Or, the decision may be based upon the
rationale that the defendant should have known of the danger.
This would allow for an application of the last clear chance doc-
trine upon an inference of knowledge. In view of the language
of the court as applied to the peculiar facts, of the case, the de-
fendant's mere failure to act reasonably under the circumstances
may be the underlying theory for applying the doctrine. At any
rate, the decision in the instant case does little to clarify the
Court of Appeals' position in regard to the last clear chance doc-
trine in New York.
Charitable Tmmunities
While various reasons have been forwarded in an attempt to
justify the immunity which has been conferred upon charitable
9. Id. at 176, 1l N. E. 2d at 869.
10. See note 5 .mjra.
11. RESTA .MUNT, Tours § 482 (1938).
12. Chadwick v. City of New York, "upra note 6 at 181, 93 N. E. 2d at 628.
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